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OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
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 Numerous individuals and groups, collectively known 
as the “Aspiring Parties,”1 filed suit to enjoin the application 
of certain of Pennsylvania’s election laws, arguing that those 
laws were unconstitutional as applied to them.  They 
prevailed.  The District Court then entered a permanent 
injunction, imposing county-based signature-gathering 
requirements that the Aspiring Parties must meet in order to 
appear on the ballot.  The Aspiring Parties appeal once more, 
arguing that those requirements are an unconstitutional vote 
dilution scheme in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.  We conclude that the record is 
inadequate to support the signature gathering requirements.  
For that reason, we will vacate the injunction and remand. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 In 2012, the Aspiring Parties filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against the Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania and the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation (the 
Commonwealth) in their official capacities.  The Aspiring 
Parties claimed that certain of Pennsylvania’s election laws 
violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
 
                                              
1 Specifically, the Aspiring Parties consist of: the Constitution 
Party of Pennsylvania, the Green Party of Pennsylvania, and 
the Libertarian Party of Pennsylvania; their respective chairs 
Joe Murphy, Carl Romanelli, and Thomas Robert Stevens; 
James Clymer, a member of the Constitution Party; and Ken 
Krawchuk, a former Libertarian Party candidate for the U.S. 
Senate. 
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 As we explained in greater detail in a prior opinion, 
political organizations, which are not classified as “major 
parties” under Pennsylvania law2 and which wish to place 
candidates on the ballot, need to gather a considerable 
number of signatures; the validity of those signatures can be 
challenged.3  A successful challenge may, under certain 
circumstances, result in an award of costs (which may be 
considerable).4  The threat of being required to pay these high 
costs has deterred some candidates from running for office.5 
 
 The Aspiring Parties’ suit sought to enjoin these 
requirements.  Initially, the case was dismissed for lack of 
standing, but we reversed on appeal.6  Next, the District Court 
held that the statutes were, in combination, unconstitutional 
as applied to the Aspiring Parties.7  We affirmed and 
remanded the case to the District Court.8 
 
 On remand, the District Court requested that the 
Aspiring Parties and the Commonwealth each submit 
proposed orders which would remedy the constitutional 
                                              
2 Currently, only the Republican and Democratic Parties 
qualify as major parties. 
3 Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 
390 (3d Cir. 2016). 
4 Id. at 391. 
5 Id. at 392. 
6 See Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 
347, 368 (3d Cir. 2014). 
7 Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes, 116 F. Supp. 
3d 486, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
8 Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 
399 (3d Cir. 2016) 
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violation.  On June 17, 2016, the Aspiring Parties requested 
an injunction, directing that “Defendant Pedro Cortes shall 
place the nominees of Plaintiffs Constitution Party of 
Pennsylvania, Green Party of Pennsylvania and Libertarian 
Party of Pennsylvania on Pennsylvania’s November 8, 2016 
general election ballot,”9 or, in the alternative, that the 
parties’ candidates shall be placed on the ballot if they submit 
appropriate paperwork “on or before the August 1, 2016 
deadline with valid signatures equal in number to the 
requirements imposed upon major party candidates pursuant 
to 25 P.S. § 2872.1 . . ..”10  
 
 The Commonwealth responded by proposing, based on 
a bill then pending before the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly,11 that the Aspiring Parties’ candidates be placed 
on the ballot provided that they gather two and one-half times 
as many signatures as major party candidates must gather.12  
                                              
9 App. 25. 
10 App. 26. 
11 See H.R. 342, 200th Gen. Assemb., § 2, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2016).  This bill has passed both houses of the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly and was “Referred to Rules” on June 27, 
2016.  As of the date of this opinion, no further action had 
been taken.  See 
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/PN/Public/btCheck.c
fm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2015&sessInd=0&billBody=H&b
illTyp=B&billNbr=0342&pn=3618. Related legislation 
amending the Pennsylvania Election Code was recently 
introduced by the same Representative who had introduced 
House Bill 342.  See H.R. 444, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Pa. 2017).    
12 App. 29-30. 
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As for the county signature requirements, this bill provided 
that, for the office of Governor, at least 5,000 signatures must 
be gathered to include at least 250 from at least 10 counties.  
(In Pennsylvania, there are the 67 counties).  For other state-
wide offices, this bill required between 1,250 and 2,500 
signatures with at least 250 from at least 5 counties.13 
 
 Between June 21 and 28, 2016, the District Court held 
five off-the-record status conferences.  At those status 
conferences, the Aspiring Parties suggested that the county-
based signature-gathering requirements in the 
Commonwealth’s proposed order were unconstitutional vote 
                                              
13 In this bill, the offices of President of the United States and 
United States Senator required 5,000 signatures without a 
county-based distribution requirement.  
7 
 
dilution schemes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.14  
Both parties submitted letter briefs outlining their positions 
on that issue. 
 
 On June 30, 2016, the District Court adopted the 
Commonwealth’s proposed order.  The District Court did not 
find any facts, nor did it explain its decision.  The Aspiring 
Parties have appealed, arguing again that the county-based 
signature-gathering requirements in the District Court’s order 
are unconstitutional. 
                                              
14 This position may seem to contradict the Aspiring Parties’ 
request that their candidates be placed on the ballot if they 
submit papers with “signatures equal in number to the 
requirements imposed upon major party candidates.”  App. 
26.  At oral argument, counsel explained that the proposed 
order was intended to require the Aspiring Parties to match 
the total number of signatures required for major parties but 
not the county-based distribution requirements.  Oral Arg. 
Recording at 4:42-5:07.  The record does not reveal whether 
the District Court initially interpreted the Aspiring Parties’ 
proposed order in this way.  However, within a few days of 
submission of the proposed orders, the District Court held 
status conferences with the parties, and the Aspiring Parties 
submitted a letter brief opposing the county-based signature-
gathering requirements.  Thus, we believe there was no 
waiver here; the District Court was informed of the Aspiring 
Parties’ views within an appropriate amount of time. 
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II. Discussion15 
A. Standard of Review 
 Our review of the constitutionality of the District 
Court’s injunction is plenary.16 
 
B. County-Based Signature Requirements 
 The question of the constitutionality of county-based 
signature-gathering requirements has a long history.  Over the 
course of three opinions in the early 1960’s, the Supreme 
Court articulated the principle of “one person, one vote” 
contained in the Equal Protection Clause.17  The essence of 
this principle is that each voter’s vote must be counted 
equally.  Observing that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
                                              
15 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
While conceding jurisdiction under § 1331, the Aspiring 
Parties argue that the District Court did not have jurisdiction 
to enter the injunction on appeal here because it reached 
issues not properly before it.  This argument lacks merit.  The 
District Court had found a constitutional violation and had 
jurisdiction to fashion a remedy.  See Consumer Party v. 
Davis, 778 F.2d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 1985) (observing that a 
district court has wide, although not infinite, discretion to 
fashion a remedial injunction). 
16 Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 66 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
17 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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Amendments protect the rights of people of different races 
and sexes to vote, the Supreme Court reasoned: 
 
If a State in a statewide election weighted the 
male vote more heavily than the female vote or 
the white vote more heavily than the Negro 
vote, none could successfully contend that that 
discrimination was allowable.  How then can 
one person be given twice or 10 times the 
voting power of another person in a statewide 
election merely because he lives in a rural area 
or because he lives in the smallest rural county?  
Once the geographical unit for which a 
representative is to be chosen is designated, all 
who participate in the election are to have an 
equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their 
sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their 
income, and wherever their home may be in that 
geographical unit.  This is required by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.18 
 
 Thereafter, in Moore v. Ogilvie, the Supreme Court 
applied this principle to requirements that candidates who 
wished to have their names placed on the ballot gather a 
minimum number of signatures from a specified number of 
counties in a state.19  In Moore, Illinois required that a 
candidate, who wished to appear on the ballot, gather 
signatures from at least 25,000 qualified voters, including at 
least 200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 counties in 
                                              
18 Gray, 372 U.S. at 379 (citation omitted). 
19 394 U.S. 814 (1969). 
10 
 
the state.20  At the time, “93.4% of the State’s registered 
voters reside[d] in the 49 most populous counties, and only 
6.6% [were] resident in the remaining 53 counties.”21  
Because “the electorate in 49 of the counties which contain 
93.4% of the registered voters [might] not form a new 
political party and place its candidates on the ballot,” but 
“25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly 
distributed among the 53 remaining counties [might] form a 
new party to elect candidates to office[,]” this requirement 
“discriminate[d] against the residents of the populous 
counties of the State in favor of rural sections” in violation of 
the “one person, one vote” principle.22 
 
 Subsequently, Anderson v. Celebrezze set out a process 
for resolving constitutional challenges to state election laws.23  
Under Anderson, a court 
 
must first consider the character and magnitude 
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must 
identify and evaluate the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the 
                                              
20 Id. at 815. 
21 Id. at 816. 
22 Id. at 819.  While the requirements at issue involved 
gathering signatures of voters rather than casting votes, the 
Court held that “[a]ll procedures used by a State as an integral 
part of the election process must pass muster against the 
charges of discrimination or of abridgment of the right to 
vote.”  Id. at 818. 
23 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
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burden imposed by its rule.  In passing 
judgment, the Court must not only determine 
the legitimacy and strength of each of those 
interests; it also must consider the extent to 
which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff’s rights.  Only after 
weighing all these factors is the reviewing court 
in a position to decide whether the challenged 
provision is unconstitutional.24 
 
While Anderson specifically involved the right to free 
association under the First Amendment, this Court has 
applied the Anderson analysis to Equal Protection challenges 
as well.25 
 
 Both before and after Anderson, county-based 
signature-gathering requirements have fared poorly in the 
courts.  At least three different circuit courts, seven district 
courts, and one state supreme court have all held in reported 
decisions that a state’s county-based signature-gathering 
                                              
24 Id. at 789. 
25 Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 643 (3d Cir. 2003); 
accord Blomquist v. Thomson, 739 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
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requirements were unconstitutional.26  The essential difficulty 
that a state faces in justifying a county-based signature-
                                              
26 See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Lomax, 471 
F.3d 1010, 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2006) (striking down a 
requirement of signatures from 10% of voters in 13 of 
Nevada’s 17 counties); Idaho Coal. United for Bears v. 
Cenarrusa, 342 F.3d 1073, 1075 & n.3, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(6% of voters in 22 of Idaho’s 44 counties); Blomquist v. 
Thomson, 739 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1984) (8,000 voters 
from 2 of Wyoming’s 23 counties); Communist Party of 
Illinois v. State Bd. of Elections for State of Ill., 518 F.2d 517, 
518, 521 (7th Cir. 1975) (25,000 voters, of which not more 
than 13,000 could be from any one of Illinois’s 102 counties); 
Montana Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Johnson, 361 F. 
Supp. 2d 1222, 1224-25, 1229-30 (D. Mont. 2005) (5% of 
voters in at least half of Montana’s 56 counties); Libertarian 
Party of Nebraska v. Beermann, 598 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Neb. 
1984) (1% of voters in 19 of Nebraska’s 93 counties); 
McCarthy v. Garrahy, 460 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (D.R.I. 1978) 
(25 signatures in 5 of Rhode Island’s 5 counties); Baird v. 
Davoren, 346 F. Supp. 515, 522 (D. Mass. 1972) (3% of 
voters in the last gubernatorial election, of which no more 
than one-third from one of Massachusetts’s 14 counties); 
Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 
(S.D. Ohio 1970) (200 voters from 30 of Ohio’s 88 counties), 
aff’d sub nom. Sweetenham v. Gilligan, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); 
Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984, 
989-991 (S.D.N.Y.) (50 voters from 62 of New York’s 62 
counties), aff’d, 400 U.S. 806 (1970); Socialist Workers Party 
v. Hare, 304 F. Supp. 534, 535-36 (E.D. Mich. 1969) (100 
voters from 10 of Michigan’s 83 counties); Gallivan v. 
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gathering requirement under Moore and Anderson is that, in 
the final step of Anderson—“consider[ing] the extent to 
which [the state’s asserted] interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff’s rights”27—alternatives to county-based 
requirements are readily available.  Typically, the state’s 
justification for county-based signature-gathering 
requirements is to keep frivolous candidates off the ballot by 
requiring that a candidate show some support across a 
significant portion of the state.28  However, signature-
gathering requirements based on geographical units other than 
counties may serve that interest just as well.  For example, 
congressional districts must have populations that are “as 
nearly as practicable” equal in population;29 thus, requiring a 
minimum number of signatures to be gathered from different 
congressional districts serves the interest of requiring 
candidates to show support across different geographical 
areas but does not dilute anyone’s voting power.30  Hence, it 
                                                                                                     
Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1095-96 (Utah 2002) (10% of voters 
from 20 of Utah’s 29 counties).   
27 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
28 See, e.g., Moore, 394 U.S. at 818 (considering the argument 
that “this law was designed to require statewide support for 
launching a new political party rather than support from a few 
localities”). 
29 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969). 
30 Numerous courts have approved of such an approach.  See, 
e.g., Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Libertarian Party v. Bond, 764 F.2d 538, 544 (8th Cir. 1985); 
Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Davis, 766 F.2d 865, 868 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Lux 
v. Judd, 651 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
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is rarely, if ever, necessary to impose county-based signature-
gathering requirements that significantly burden voting rights. 
 
 However, not all county-based signature-gathering 
requirements are sufficiently stringent to cause constitutional 
concern.  As courts, beginning with a district court in Zautra 
v. Miller, have held, county-based signature-gathering 
requirements are constitutional when such requirements have 
no “real or appreciable impact upon the franchise . . ..”31  In 
Zautra, Utah required that “new political associations . . . 
secure the signatures of 500 registered voters, including at 
least ten signatures of registered voters from each of ten 
counties, in order to qualify as a political party with the 
accompanying right to place candidates on the ballot.”32  
Crucial to the finding that there was no appreciable impact 
was the fact that the number of signatures required from each 
county was only ten.  Ten signatures from ten counties was 
small by any measure; for example, the district court 
observed that one hundred geographically distributed 
signatures in Utah amounted to only about one-ninth as many 
signatures per one million population as did the comparable 
requirement in Moore.33  The ten-county requirement was 
also a lesser burden than the comparable requirement in 
Moore, and fulfilling the county-based signature-gathering 
requirement was not the only way to place a candidate’s name 
on the ballot in Utah (although it had been in Illinois in 
Moore).34  Because of these considerations, Zautra held that 
the requirement was constitutional because it exerted no 
                                              
31 348 F. Supp. 847, 850 (D. Utah 1972). 
32 Id. at 848. 
33 Id. at 849 & n.3. 
34 Id. at 849-50. 
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appreciable impact on the franchise.  While Zautra was 
decided before Anderson, it is consistent with the Anderson 
analysis:  If there is no appreciable impact on the franchise, 
then there is no injury to constitutional rights that the court 
must balance against a state’s interests.  The state’s interests 
simply prevail. 
 
 Zautra illustrates the importance of considering the 
real-world impact of voting rights restrictions.  This Court has 
also emphasized this point, noting that under Anderson, 
 
the rigorousness of our inquiry into the 
propriety of a state election law depends upon 
the extent to which a challenged regulation 
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  When those rights are subjected to 
severe restrictions, the regulation must be 
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.  However, when a state 
election law provision imposes only reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the 
State’s important regulatory interests are 
generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.35 
 
 Because this inquiry is concerned with the extent to 
which a challenged regulation actually burdens constitutional 
rights, this inquiry is “fact intensive.”36  It requires on-the-
                                              
35 Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks, 
brackets, and citations omitted). 
36 Patriot Party of Allegheny Cty. v. Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of 
Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 1996). 
16 
 
record analysis of the facts pertaining to the particular 
restriction under scrutiny.  Such facts include the number of 
counties in the state at issue, the distribution of voters 
throughout those counties, and any other indications of the 
magnitude of vote dilution that will take place under the 
challenged restriction.  A requirement that allows a minority 
of the population to thwart the majority’s will, as did the 
requirement in Moore,37 certainly has an appreciable impact, 
but even lesser requirements may have an appreciable impact 
depending on the factual circumstances surrounding the 
requirements. 
 
C. The District Court’s Injunction 
 Under these standards, the District Court’s order must 
be vacated.  We recognize that the District Court was working 
under significant time pressure; this Court issued its 
affirmance in June 2016 when the campaign season had 
already begun.  As a result, the District Court needed to work 
as quickly as possible in order to provide fair relief to the 
parties.  Nonetheless, the District Court did not make any 
factual findings or provide any explanation on the record of 
the factors it considered in determining that its injunction was 
appropriate.  Because resolving vote dilution challenges is a 
fact intensive process and because county-based signature-
gathering requirements have been held to be constitutional 
only when they have been shown to have no appreciable 
                                              
37 If the 6.6% of the registered voters who lived in the least-
populous counties in Illinois withheld their signatures, they 
could block candidates from being placed on the ballot.  See 
Moore, 394 U.S. at 819. 
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impact on the franchise, the lack of fact-finding requires that 
we vacate the District Court’s order. 
 
 The District Court may determine to enter the same 
order again—or to issue another injunction containing 
county-based signature-gathering requirements.  However, 
the court must first conclude, after considering the factors and 
finding facts, that the restrictions are constitutional under 
Anderson.  Given the justification for these requirements that 
the Commonwealth has presented,38 the District Court can 
impose the county-based signature-gathering requirements if 
it concludes that the requirements would have no appreciable 
impact on voting rights.39  The court did not so conclude here, 
and we have no basis in the record to reach such a conclusion 
independently. 
                                              
38 The Commonwealth has suggested in its brief that the 
county-based signature-gathering requirements are necessary 
for a minor party to show “some modicum of support” before 
a minor party candidate can be placed on the ballot.   
39 The Commonwealth observes that Pennsylvania state 
courts, citing Zautra, have held that the county-based 
signature-gathering requirements for major-party candidates 
are constitutional because they have no appreciable impact on 
the franchise.  See Petition of Berg, 713 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Pa. 
1998); Cavanaugh v. Schaeffer, 444 A.2d 1308, 1311-12 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982).  While the Commonwealth is correct that 
the state courts have so held, the requirements here involve 
two and one-half times as many signatures.  Thus, even if the 
impact of the lesser requirements for major-party candidates 
is negligible—an issue not before this Court and one about 
which we express no opinion—the greater requirements here 
still must be analyzed separately. 
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III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
